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Center for National Security Studies v. United States
Department of Justice: Keeping the USA PATRIOT Act in
Check One Material Witness at a Time
In response to the government's refusal to disclose information
regarding its investigation into the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001,' a coalition of nonprofit organizations attempted to pierce the
veil of secrecy surrounding the people detained by the government.
This coalition, led by the Center for National Security Studies at
George Washington University,2 requested information through the
Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA").3 When the government
refused to release the requested information, the Center for National
Security Studies filed suit, and the Federal District Court for the
1. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in
New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., the U.S. government launched a
massive investigation that has led to the detention of over one thousand people. See infra
notes 16-18 and accompanying text. Aside from the number of people detained, the
government has disclosed only the broadest outline of its investigation, choosing instead to
operate largely in secret. See infra notes 58-76 and accompanying text. The government's
investigation has been described by an Assistant Attorney General at the Department of
Justice as "an aggressive and systematic campaign that utilizes all available information,
all authorized investigative techniques, and all legal authorities at our disposal. The
overriding goal is to prevent and disrupt terrorist activity by questioning, investigating,
and arresting those who violate the law and threaten our national security." Viet D. Dinh,
Freedom and Security After September 11, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 399, 401 (2002);
see also Adam Clymer, Government Openness at Issue As Bush Holds on To Records,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2003, at Al (describing the Bush administration's deliberate policy of
not releasing information to the public unless legally obligated, as compared to the Clinton
administration's policy of releasing information whenever possible); infra note 78
(discussing the Bush Administration's policy of releasing as little information as possible).
2. For a list of the other organizations involved in the lawsuit, see Amended
Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2002) (Civil Action No. 01-2500), available at http://
cnss.gwu.edu/-cnss/cnsscomplaint.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000); see infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. For further
discussion of FOIA, see CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 182 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(noting that in enacting FOIA, "Congress, it is clear, sought to assure that the
Government would not operate behind a veil of secrecy, and it narrowly tailored the
exceptions to the fundamental goal of disclosure"). Since the decision in Center for
National Security Studies v. United States Department of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94
(D.D.C. 2002), FOIA has been amended to prohibit agencies that are under the
jurisdiction of the intelligence committee from making records available to foreign
governments or their representatives. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2003, Pub. L. No. 107-306, § 312, 116 Stat. 2383, 2390-91 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)).
This amendment does not affect the decision in Center for National Security Studies. Nor
does it affect the analysis of this Recent Development.
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District of Columbia overruled the government's withholding of the
names of the individuals detained.'
Center for National Security Studies v. United States Department
of Justice5 held that the government must release the names of those
held on material witness warrants in connection with the September
11 terrorist attacks.6 The district court's decision is consistent with the
goals of FOIA in so far as it holds the government accountable to the
public and limits the government's ability to arrest and detain
unknown numbers of people secretly.7 Individuals held on material
witness warrants have neither been charged with nor convicted of a
crime; their detention is permitted under certain circumstances in
anticipation of testimony in a criminal proceeding.' Nevertheless, the
government has two main arguments for denying plaintiff's FOIA
requests. First, the government argues that disclosing the identities of
the detainees would jeopardize its investigation and threaten the
safety of the detainees.9 Second, the government claims that, because
the material witnesses are held pursuant to grand jury subpoenas,
their identities are protected by Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which requires secrecy of grand jury
proceedings." In Center for National Security Studies, the district
court held that the government could not rely on rules of grand jury
secrecy as a basis for nondisclosure. Considered in light of the
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 ("USA
PATRIOT Act") amendments to Rule 6(e),' 2 which permit greater
4. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. United States Dep't of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 111
(D.D.C. 2002). Center for National Securities Studies deals with three different categories
of detainees: those held on immigration charges; those held on federal criminal charges;
and those held on material witness warrants. Id. at 98. This Recent Development focuses
only on those detainees held on material witness warrants.
5. 215 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2002).
6. Id. at ill.
7. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (discussing FOIA's presumption that
the government should disclose official information to the public).
8. See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between
material witnesses and grand jury proceedings).
9. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (discussing the government's
reliance on FOIA exemptions which authorize nondisclosure of information collected for
law enforcement purposes).
10. See infra notes 67-76 and accompanying text (discussing the government's
argument that the rules of grand jury secrecy protect the names of detainees from
disclosure).
11. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 106-07.
12. In order to assist the Justice Department in its terrorism investigation, Congress
passed the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act ("USA PATRIOT Act") of 2001, Pub. L. No.
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disclosure of grand jury information within the walls of the
government, the district court's decision represents a careful balance
between public accountability and protection of individual civil
liberties on the one hand, and the government's ability to effectively
investigate the terrorist attacks on the other hand.
Rule 6(e), as amended by the USA PATRIOT Act, allows the
Justice Department to disclose a considerable amount of information
obtained for and during grand jury proceedings to other government
agencies, such as the CIA, without requiring even the traditional
safeguard of prior judicial approval.13 By ordering the disclosure of
the detainees' names, the district court ensured, through oversight by
interested organizations, such as the plaintiffs in this case, and the
public, that the constitutional rights and general welfare of the
detainees are protected.
This Recent Development will analyze the effect of the Center
for National Security Studies decision on the expanded authority of
government agencies to share grand jury information under the USA
PATRIOT Act.14 First, this Recent Development will discuss what
little information is known about the detainees. It will then introduce
the relevant provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act and the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure governing grand jury proceedings.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.A.). As discussed infra
notes 45-55 and accompanying text, the USA PATRIOT Act included amendments to
Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; these amendments allow for greater
disclosure of grand jury information among federal agencies without traditional judicial
oversight. § 203(a)(1), 115 Stat. at 278-80.
13. See infra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
14. In considering the effect of the district court's decision on the government's on-
going investigation, it may be important to ask a fundamental question: Are we at war
against terrorism? The implications of this question are vast and are, therefore, beyond
the scope of this Recent Development. But if we are at war, then this discussion of FOIA
and rules of criminal procedure may be moot: if the detainees are not within the scope of
the criminal justice system, then an entirely different set of rules apply. For example, the
United States is currently holding Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen, in a Navy brig in South
Carolina without criminal charges. See Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 569 (S.D.N.Y.
2002). Padilla, who was initially detained on a material witness warrant, is now being held
as an enemy combatant and is therefore afforded none of the legal rights generally
ensured by the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 568-69. On the other hand, there is reason to
believe that, even if we are at war, the people currently detained may be prosecuted
criminally, or, as material witnesses, may assist in the prosecution of others. For example,
the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center resulted in criminal prosecutions, see United
States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 105 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam), as did the bombing of the
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, see United States v. McVeigh, 153
F.3d 1166, 1176 (10th Cir. 1998), and not treatment of the perpetrators as war criminals. If
even these individuals accused of actual bombings are treated within the justice system,
certainly those held on material witness warrants should be afforded similar protections.
2160 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
After considering the applicable statutes, this Recent Development
will briefly review the district court's decision and will attempt to
explain why the court's decision should be applauded for rejecting the
government's attempt to keep all aspects of the terrorism
investigations secret. 5
In the months following the attacks on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon, the government's investigation led to the detention
of over one thousand individuals.16 According to the Department of
Justice, these detainees fall into three general categories: those held
on immigration charges; those held on federal criminal charges; and
those held on material witness warrants. 7  Though very little
information is known about any of the detainees, even less is known
about those held on material witness warrants. On November 27,
2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft held a press conference at
which he stated that, as of that date, 548 people were being held on
immigration charges, 104 people had been charged with federal
criminal violations, and that an unspecified number of "other
individuals" were being held on material witness warrants. 8 A recent
15. Many important issues are raised by the government's unwillingness to release
information about the September 11 detainees, especially information regarding the large
number of individuals held on immigration charges. See, e.g., Detroit Free Press v.
Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming the district court's finding that the
government's "blanket closure of deportation hearings in 'special interest' cases [is]
unconstitutional"). As mentioned supra in note 4, however, the scope of this Recent
Development will be limited to a discussion of the detainees held on material witness
warrants and the implications of this decision on grand jury secrecy in light of the USA
PATRIOT Act.
16. On October 25, 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft announced that the
government had "arrested or detained nearly 1,000 individuals as part of the September 11
terrorism investigation." Attorney General John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks for the US
Mayors Conference (Oct. 25, 2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisis
remarks10_25.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also Dan Eggen &
Susan Schmidt, Count of Released Detainees Is Hard To Pin Down, WASH. POST, Nov. 6,
2001, at A10 (reporting that the Department of Justice indicated that on November 5,
2001 the government held 1,182 individuals).
17. See Attorney General Ashcroft Provides Total Number of Federal Criminal
Charges and INS Detainees (Nov. 27, 2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/200l/
agcrisisremarks I_27.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter
Statement of Attorney General Ashcroft (Nov. 27, 2001)].
18. Statement of Attorney General Ashcroft (Nov. 27, 2001), supra note 17. Human
Rights Watch has been able to identify thirty-five people held on material witness
warrants. United States, Presumption of Guilt: Human Rights Abuses of Post-September
11 Detainees, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Human Rights Watch, New York, N.Y.), Aug.
2002, at 3, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/us911/USA0802.pdf (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Human Rights Watch].
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report by Human Rights Watch19 indicates that, as of August 2002,
the government held the vast majority of the detainees-as many as
752-on immigration-related- charges.2z Updated information from
the government regarding the number of detainees has not been
forthcoming. The Justice Department reportedly prepared updated
information about select detainees ,in -January 2002, but that
information has not been released to the public.21 One theory
regarding the lack of new information is that the government has
stopped tracking the information itself to avoid being required to
release it.22
Human Rights Watch reports that most of the individuals held
on immigration charges are from Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey. 23 The
Justice Department has not released information about the
nationalities of the detainees held on material witness warrants or
charged with federal crimes.24  The government has consistently
claimed, as will be discussed below, that the release of any
information about the detainees poses a threat to the government's
investigation, as well as the privacy of those detained.25  The
government further contends that the detainees are free to identify
themselves at any time.26
The contention that detainees can self-identify, however, is
inconsistent with reports of the conditions in which the government
holds many of the detainees. Many of these detainees reported that
they were unable to communicate with their lawyers or family
members for extended periods of time, and others indicated that the
only form of communication permitted was via U.S. mail.27 Human
19. Human Rights Watch is an international, nongovernmental watch-dog
organization that investigates and reports on human rights violations around the world.
20. Human Rights Watch, supra note 18, at 4.
21. Id. at 19.
22. DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 85 (2001) [hereinafter
Hearing] (statement of Kate Martin, Director, Center for National Security Studies).
23. Human Rights Watch, supra note 18, at 10.
24. Id. The Department of Justice has said, however, that the identities of all the
detainees arrested on criminal charges have been made public. Hearing, supra note 22, at
10 (statement of Michael Chertoff, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S.
Department of Justice).
25. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 22, at 10 (statement of Michael Chertoff, Assistant
Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice) (echoing other Justice
Department officials in stating that the withholding of information is justified by concerns
for detainee privacy and law-enforcement purposes).
26. Id.
27. Human Rights Watch, supra note 18, at 62-64. In addition, several of the material
witnesses were strip-searched and cavity-searched on multiple occasions, and at least three
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Rights Watch reports that, in the case of people detained on material
witness warrants in particular, all of the detainees were held in federal
prisons, many for several months, and often in conditions more
restrictive than the conditions of the general criminal population.28
Federal prison officials at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in
New York, where many of the detainees are being or have been held,
reportedly designated the September 11 detainees as "high security
inmates. '29 Prison officials also chose to keep the material witnesses
segregated from the rest of the population and subjected them to
"special precautions;" such precautions include videotaping their
movements.3" These measures had previously been used to supervise
the activities of the men charged with bombing the American
embassies in Africa in 1998.31
The government has assured the public that it is acting within
constitutional limits and that the rights and privileges of the detainees
are being respected at all times.32  Evidence to the contrary
emphasizes the need for the government to release, at a minimum,
the detainees' names so that the public can monitor and protect the
rights of the detainees. As Senator Russell Feingold remarked, after
noting cases similar to what Human Rights Watch has reported, "We
simply cannot tell if those cases are aberrations or an indication of
systemic problems, if the Justice Department will not release further
men were held in solitary confinement for extended periods of time-one detainee
reported that the lights were kept on in his cell twenty-four hours a day for two months.
Id. at 61-63.
28. Id. at 60-67.
29. Id. at 67.
30. Id. Similar findings regarding conditions of detainment have been reported by
Amnesty International. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S CONCERNS REGARDING POST SEPTEMBER 11
DETENTIONS IN THE USA 15-23, 27-38 (2002), available at http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/
aidoc-pdf.nsf/Index/AMR510442002ENGLISH/$File/AMR5104402.pdf (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
31. Human Rights Watch, supra note 18, at 68.
32. See Hearing, supra note 22, at 206 (statement of Viet D. Dinh, Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Department of Justice). Assistant Attorney General
Viet D. Dinh assured the public that
[e]very one of these detentions is fully consistent with established constitutional
and statutory authority.... Every one of these individuals has a right to access
to counsel.... Every person detained, whether on criminal or immigration
charges or as a material witness, has the right to make phone calls to family
members and attorneys. No one is being denied their right to talk to their
attorneys.
2162 [Vol. 81
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information about those being held in custody. '33 Furthermore, even
if the cases of detainees being denied fundamental rights are
aberrations, no detainee's fundamental rights should be denied, and
the most effective way to protect these rights is to make details of the
detentions public. Failure to release information about the detainees
may have the additional effect of undermining public confidence in
the government's investigation.
In order to understand the impact of the district court's decision
on the detainees held on material witness warrants, it is necessary to
understand first how the USA PATRIOT Act altered the rules of
grand jury secrecy. Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure states as a general rule that all "matters occurring before
the grand jury" will not be disclosed except under a few limited
circumstances.34 The rationales for grand jury secrecy are firmly
established35 and have been justified as contributing to the success of
grand jury investigations and the protection of grand jury witnesses.36
Traditionally, disclosure of grand jury material has been carefully
controlled by Rule 6(e)37 and by district courts that, under limited
33. Hearing, supra note 22, at 201 (statement of Russell D. Feingold, Member, Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary).
34. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). Exceptions to the general rule of nondisclosure are
stated in Rule 6(e)(3) and allow for disclosure to "an attorney for the government for use
in the performance of such attorney's duty; and ... such government personnel ... as are
deemed necessary by an attorney for the government to assist ... in the performance of
such attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law." FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(i)-(ii).
Rule 6(e)(3) further states that any disclosure made under the rule must be used only for
assisting the government attorney, and that the government attorney
shall promptly provide the district court, before which was impaneled the grand
jury whose material has been so disclosed, with the names of the persons to
whom such disclosure has been made, and shall certify that the attorney has
advised such persons of their obligations of secrecy under this rule.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(B). The government also relies on Rule 6(e)(6) which states
that "[riecords, orders and subpoenas relating to grand jury proceedings shall be kept
under seal to the extent and for such time as is necessary to prevent disclosure of matters
occurring before a grand jury." FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(6).
35. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 219 n.10 (1979); In re
Craig, 131 F.3d 99, 101-02 (2d Cir. 1997); SEC v. Dresser Indus., 628 F.2d 1368, 1382 n.36
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc).
36. Craig, 131 F.3d at 101-02.
37. See supra note 34. In addition, Rule 6(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure states:
General rule of secrecy. A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an
operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an
attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under
paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of this subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring
before the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules. No
obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with
this rule. A knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court.
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circumstances, can release information to a defendant, another grand
jury, or state law enforcement officials.38 In United States v. Sells
Engineering,39 the Supreme Court recognized the risks inherent in
permitting disclosure of grand jury material for any purpose beyond a
criminal investigation.4" The Court noted that the release of grand
jury information for use in civil cases would create a risk of grand jury
manipulation by prosecutors, and an additional risk that prosecutors
might convene grand juries on the pretext of criminal investigations,
only to then use the information gathered in civil cases.41 The risks
associated with disclosure of grand jury material for use in other, even
related, criminal investigations, such as the investigation into the
terrorist attacks, are just as real as the risks for use in civil cases
described by the Court in Sells Engineering. Any rule that allows
grand jury information to be disclosed for purposes other than
criminal prosecution for which that grand jury was convened
threatens "the integrity of the grand jury itself."42
Despite such risks, in support of the government's investigation
into the terrorist attacks, on October 26, 2001, Congress enacted the
USA PATRIOT Act.43 The Justice Department hailed the act as an
invaluable tool in its fight against terrorism." The Justice
Department has been especially enthusiastic about section 203 of the
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2).
38. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(ii)-(iv).
39. 463 U.S. 418 (1983).
40. Id. at 432-34.
41. Id. at 432.
42. Id. Recognizing this, the Court noted in Sells Engineering that
use of grand jury materials by Government agencies in civil or administrative
settings threatens to subvert the limitations applied outside the grand jury
context on the Government's powers of discovery and investigation. While there
are some limits on the investigative powers of the grand jury, there are few if any
other forums in which a governmental body has such relatively unregulated
power to compel other persons to divulge information or produce evidence.
Other agencies, both within and without the Justice Department, operate under
specific and detailed statutes, rules, or regulations conferring only limited
authority to require citizens to testify or produce evidence.... To allow these
agencies to circumvent their usual methods of discovery would not only subvert
the limitations and procedural requirements built into those methods, but also
would grant to the Government a virtual ex parte form of discovery.
Id. at 433-34.
43. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
44. Hearing, supra note 22, at 8 (statement of Michael Chertoff, Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice) ("[W]e owe a debt of gratitude to
Congress for passing the USA PATRIOT Act which makes [law-enforcement] work more
efficient.").
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USA PATRIOT Act.45 Section 203 amended Rule 6(e) by adding the
following to section (3)(C)(i), which allows for exceptions to the
general rule of nondisclosure of grand jury information:
(V) when the matters involve foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence .... or foreign intelligence (as defined in
clause (iv) of this subparagraph), [disclosure of such
information may be made] to any Federal law enforcement,
intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or
national security official in order to assist the official
receiving the information in the performance of his official
duties.46
This section represents a "subtle but important change" to the
rules of federal grand jury secrecy, resulting in increased
communication between and information sharing among law
enforcement, national security, and defense agencies. 7. This change
authorizes disclosure of grand jury material to a number of federal
agencies without court authorization and for purposes unrelated to
the grand jury's investigation.48
Considering the importance of maintaining the secrecy of grand
jury material (especially regarding the terrorism investigation), the
changes made by the USA PATRIOT Act are indeed worrisome.
Under the amended Rule 6(e), the Justice Department is permitted to
share information collected by a grand jury that is related to foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence with a wide range of government
agencies. These agencies include all federal law enforcement
agencies, 49 as well as intelligence agencies (including those within the
Department of Defense and the several branches of the armed
services), the Departments of Treasury and Energy, the Immigration
and Naturalization Service, and the Office of Homeland Security."
45. See Hearing, supra note 22, at 311 (statement of John Ashcroft, Attorney General,
U.S. Department of Justice) ("Within hours of the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, we
made use of its provisions to begin enhanced information sharing between the law
enforcement and intelligence communities.:).
46. USA PATRIOT Act, § 203(a)(1), 115 Stat. at 279-80.
47. Sara Sun Beale & James E. Felman, The Consequences of Enlisting Federal Grand
Juries in the War on Terrorism: Assessing the USA PATRIOT Act's Changes to Grand
Jury Secrecy, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 699, 699 (2002).
48. USA PATRIOT Act, § 203(a)(1)(C), 115 Stat. at 279; Beale & Felman, supra note
47, at 707-10.
49. Federal law enforcement agencies include the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Drug Enforcement Agency, Secret Service, Postal Inspection Service, U.S. Marshall
Service, Customs Service, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Bureau of Alcohol
Tobacco, and Firearms. See Beale & Felman, supra note 47, at 709 & n.51.
50. Id. at 709-10.
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In the context of the terrorist attacks and in the interest of bringing to
justice those responsible, this expanded ability to share information is
understandable. For example, if a U.S. Attorney were to learn,
through a grand jury investigation, that a credible terrorist plan
threatened the United States, the importance of the government's
ability to share such information with the FBI would be obvious.
The USA PATRIOT Act amendments to Rule 6(e), however,
allow for such disclosure without requiring prior judicial
authorization." In other words, the decision as to what foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence information should be disclosed is
left to itidividual federal prosecutors. These prosecutors are only
required to notify the court of the disclosure within a reasonable time
after the disclosure has been made.52  This procedure differs
significantly from the procedure required for disclosure of
information unrelated to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence,
in which case a petition for disclosure must be made to and approved
by a district court judge prior to the disclosure. 3 The requirement of
prior judicial approval has been a traditional safeguard of grand jury
secrecy, and, as noted above, Congress and the Supreme Court have
been hesitant to allow any disclosure beyond what may be required
51. The following subsection (iii) was added to Rule 6(e)(3)(C) by the USA
PATRIOT Act:
Any federal official to whom information is disclosed pursuant to clause (i)(V) of
this subparagraph may use that information only as necessary in the conduct of
that person's official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized
disclosure of such information. Within a reasonable time after such disclosure,
an attorney for the government shall file under seal a notice with the court
stating the fact that such information was disclosed and the departments,
agencies, or entities to which the disclosure was made.
USA PATRIOT Act, § 203(a)(1), 115 Stat. at 279-80.
52. In addition, the USA PATRIOT Act's (and hence amended Rule 6(e)'s)
definition of foreign intelligence is fairly broad, stating that:
"foreign intelligence information" means-
(I) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, that
relates to the ability of the United States to protect against-
(aa) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power;
(bb) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent
of a foreign power; or
(cc) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or
network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or
(II) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, with
respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to-
(aa) the national defense or the security of the United States; or
(bb) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the Unites States.
Id.
53. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D).
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for criminal prosecution. 4 Although Congress has made changes to
grand jury secrecy rules in the past, virtually all of the changes have
left intact the requirement of judicial oversight, assuring that courts
would continue to control the release of grand jury information.55
The effect of the USA PATRIOT Act amendments on grand
jury practice is unclear, in part because the changes are recent, and in
part because there were exceptions to the general rule of grand jury
secrecy prior to the USA PATRIOT Act. It is clear, however, that
the government is attempting, by relying on the USA PATRIOT Act,
to manipulate grand jury secrecy to its own advantage, at the expense
of the material witness detainees. The primary justification for grand
jury secrecy is that grand jury witnesses may fear retribution from the
people or organizations about whom they have information; as a
result of this fear, they may not be willing to testify.56 Any hesitancy
to testify of course is significantly less of a problem when the
government detains witnesses, therefore, the possibility that fear may
affect a witness's willingness to testify may encourage increased
detention by the government in anticipation of grand jury testimony.
This possibility clearly relates to one of the government's arguments
against disclosing the names of those detained: if the witnesses are
identified, they will be in danger. 7 But the government's argument
ignores the fact that the USA PATRIOT Act currently permits
disclosure within and among government agencies. The government
is in effect trying to use the secrecy of grand juries as a sword as well
as a shield. On the one hand, the government can use its expanded
power to further its investigation, which will likely lead to additional
arrests and detentions. On the other hand, the government argues
that releasing the names will endanger witnesses, and therefore grand
jury secrecy should shield those names from disclosure. Thus,
regardless of the USA PATRIOT Act's effect on grand juries in
general, the new disclosure rules have already had an impact on the
terrorist investigation and the lives of the people currently detained
by furthering the government's desire for the detentions to remain
secret.
54. See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
55. Beale & Felman, supra note 47, at 705-07.
56. Id. at 710.
57. This is the government's argument for withholding the names under FOIA
Exemption 7F, see infra note 65, as well as the government's argument that the names are
protected by Rule 6(e). Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. United States Dep't of Justice, 215 F.
Supp. 2d 94, 105-06 (D.D.C. 2002).
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In response to the secrecy surrounding the detainees, the Center
for National Security Studies submitted FOIA requests to the
Department of Justice.58 The FOIA requests sought the following
information: the name of each detainee and his or her citizenship
status; the dates and location of each arrest or detention; the current
location of each detainee; the dates any charges were filed; the dates
of release, if any; and, finally, the reason for each detention or arrest
and the status of the charges.59 The government denied the FOIA
requests, citing several exemptions to FOIA.6°  Following the
government's denial, the Center for National Security Studies
brought suit against the Department of Justice, seeking release of the
requested information.6' Center for National Security Studies v.
United States Department of Justice overruled, in part, the
government's refusal to disclose the information.62 Specifically, the
District Court for the District of Columbia held that the government
must release the names of everyone detained in connection with the
September 11 terrorist attack.63
The Department of Justice, which bears the burden of
establishing why the information should not be disclosed, 64 relied
primarily on FOIA Exemptions 7A, 7C, and 7F. These exemptions
permit withholding of information collected for law enforcement
purposes when disclosure may interfere with such proceedings or may
be a threat to personal privacy or individual safety. 65 The court
58. On October 29, 2001, FOIA requests were sent to three offices at the Department
of Justice: the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, and the Office of Information Privacy. For more information about the FOIA
requests, see Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2002) (Civil Action No. 01-
2500), available at http://cnss.gwu.edu/ -cnss/cnsscomplaint.pdf (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
59. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 97. In addition to the information
listed above, the Center for National Security Studies also sought the release of the
identities of lawyers representing the detainees, the identities of courts involved in any
related proceedings, and any and all policy directives "issued to officials about making
public statements or disclosures about these individuals or about the sealing of judicial or
immigration proceedings." Id.
60. Id. at 98, 100.
61. Following the denial of a FOIA request, the district court reviews the
government's decision de novo. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000).
62. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 96-97.
63. Id. at 111.
64. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
65. Id. § 552(b)(7)(A), (C), (F). Specifically, Exemptions 7A, 7C, and 7F protect from
disclosure information "compiled for law enforcement purposes" when such information
"(A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.... (C)
could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
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rejected each of the government's arguments with respect to
withholding the names of the detainees based on these exemptions.66
The court then turned to the government's reliance on FOIA
Exemption 3, which prohibits disclosure of information that is
protected by a federal statute.67 The government relied on Rule 6(e),
which has been held to be a statute for the purposes of FOIA
Exemption 3.68 The government argued, in so far as the requested
information does not fall under one of the exceptions to the general
rule of grand jury secrecy,69 any information pertaining to a grand
jury is protected from disclosure under Rule 6(e). The government
contended, specifically, that the identities of those held on material
witness warrants should not be disclosed because the warrants were
issued in anticipation of grand jury proceedings and the release of any
information about the witnesses would compromise grand jury
investigations. 0  In response, the court observed that "the
privacy,.., or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of
any individual." Id.
66. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 101-07. Specifically, the court found
that the government's reliance on Exemption 7A, premised on the expectation "that
disclosure will deter cooperation because terrorist groups will intimidate or cut off contact
with the detainees.., is unpersuasive for several reasons." Id. at 101. Similarly, the court
concluded that the government's reliance on Exemptions 7C and 7F was misplaced. While
recognizing that "there is a substantial privacy interest in not being associated with alleged
criminal activity," the court also noted that "Exemption 7C does not provide blanket
protection to all information that could invade personal privacy. Indeed, if privacy
concerns alone were sufficient, the Government could arrest and jail any person accused
of a heinous crime and refuse to reveal his or her name to the public." Id. at 105. The
court concluded that "the public's interest in learning the identities of those arrested and
detained is essential to verifying whether the Government is operating within the bounds
of the law." Id. at 106.
67. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). Exemption 3 states:
This section does not apply to matters that are ... (3) specifically exempted from
disclosure by statute ... provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters
be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the
issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular
types of matters to be withheld ....
Id.
68. See Fund for Constitutional Gov't v. Nat'l Archives & Records Serv., 656 F.2d
856, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding that "by any definition Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) is a
statute").
69. Id. at 868-70 (offering a good example of the inquiry required when considering
the application of Rule 6(e) to FOIA Exemption 3).
70. See Decl. of James Reynolds at $ 33-35, Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2002) (Civil Action No. 01-2500),
available at http://www.cnss.gwu. edu/-cnss/dojreynoldsdeclaration.htm (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) (arguing that to disclose any information about material
witnesses would reveal the strategy of the investigation, and noting that "these
justifications are particularly compelling for the material witnesses, as they are believed to
have evidence directly relevant to acts of terrorism").
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Government's treatment of material witness information is deeply
troubling. '71  The court was troubled by the tenuous links the
government made between FOIA Exemption 3 and the material
witness warrant statute,72 and concluded that the Government failed
to meet its burden of establishing that release of the names of those
held on material witness warrants would in fact jeopardize the grand
jury investigations.73 As a result, the court held that, through
Exemption 3, Rule 6(e) could not justify the government's failure to
release the names.74 Concluding that the government must release
the names of the detainees, the court also held that the government
must both make public the identities of the detainees' attorneys75 and
conduct a more thorough search for documents related to the
government's position on the disclosure of information.76
The effect of this decision on the detainees should be evident
from the reports of their confinement described above, namely, that
requiring the government to inform the public who is being detained
ensures that the detainees are provided adequate assistance of
counsel. This requirement also ensures that the government will hold
detainees in conditions suitable to their status as witnesses with
information potentially valuable to the government's investigation,
rather than as convicted terrorists.
FOIA " 'seeks to permit access to official information long
shielded unnecessarily from public view and attempts to create a
judicially enforceable public right to secure such information from
possibly unwilling official hands.' "I' Thus, in order to withhold
71. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 106. The court went on to note that
A person apprehended as a material witness is not accused of any crime but,
instead, has been arrested because it is believed that his or her "testimony is
material in a criminal proceeding."... Nevertheless, the Government has kept
secret virtually everything about these individuals, including the number of
people arrested and detained, as well as their identities. The public has no idea
whether there are 40, 400, or possibly more people in detention on material
witness warrants.
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000)).
72. See 18 U.S.C § 3144 (2000).
73. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 107.
74. Id. The court further noted that to the extent any court orders prohibit the
release of names, the government may submit further evidence of such sealing orders for
the purpose of withholding those names. Id. at 107-08.
75. Id. at 109.
76. Id. at 109-11. The court did find that the government properly withheld
information about the dates and locations of arrests, detentions, and releases under FOIA
Exemptions 7A and 7F. Id. at 108.
77. Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (quoting EPA v. Mink,
410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973)).
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information about the detainees, the government must overcome
FOIA's strong presumption that such information should be
disclosed.78  Because the government will often, and frequently for
good reason, need to keep official information secret, there are nine
exemptions to the FOIA's general rule of disclosure.79 Nevertheless,
78. Despite the FOIA's presumption that information should be released, the Bush
Administration issued a revised policy regarding release of information under FOIA in
October 2001. See Office of the Attorney General, Memorandum for Heads of All
Federal Departments and Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/
011012.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). This policy, establishing a
"sound legal basis" standard under which the Department of Justice will defend decisions
not to release information if there is any legal basis to do so, is directly contrary to the
policy of the Clinton Administration. Id. The previous policy encouraged the release of
information, and directed federal agencies to release, on a discretionary basis, exempt
information so long as there was no "foreseeable harm" resulting from the disclosure. See
Attorney General Reiterates FOIA Policy, FOIA Update, Spring 1997, http://www.usdoj.
gov/oip/foia-updates/VolXVIII_2/pagel.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); see also Hearing, supra note 22, at 87-88 (statement of Kate Martin, Director,
Center for National Security Studies) (describing the Bush Administration's new policy);
Clymer, supra note 1 (same).
79. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2000). The nine exemptions are:
(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order
to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are
in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of
this title) provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld
from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B)
establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of
matters to be withheld;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person
and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to
the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information
(A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B)
would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C)
could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a
confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any
private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in
the case of a record or information compiled by criminal law enforcement
authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a
lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a
confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law
enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law
enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be
expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to
endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
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these exemptions do not change FOIA's overriding policy that
"disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act."8
Therefore, the burden rests on the government to establish that the
information requested falls under one of the exemptions.
Section 3144 of Title 18 of the Unites States Code governs the
detention of material witnesses.81 The government argued that this
statute authorizes detention of grand jury material witnesses, and
that, through FOIA Exemption 3, Rule 6(e) protects the identities of
the material witness detainees from disclosure. The government's
argument, however, is tenuous.82  Rule 6(e) does not explicitly
prohibit disclosure of the identities of material witnesses.83 Prior
attempts to invoke Rule 6(e) as a protection against FOIA requests,
although not dealing explicitly with material witnesses, have
prompted courts to note that the mere fact that information is
associated with grand jury proceedings is not enough to immunize
such information from disclosure.' In addition, the rule governing
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports
prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the
regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological or geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning
wells.
Id.
80. Rose, 425 U.S. at 361.
81. Section 3144 states in relevant part:
If it appears from an affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of a person is
material in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become
impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a judicial officer
may order the arrest of the person ....
18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000).
82. The district court went further and stated explicitly that "[tihe Government's
reliance on grand jury secrecy rules to justify withholding of the identities of material
witnesses is fundamentally wrong as a matter of law." Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94,106 (D.D.C. 2002) (emphasis added).
83. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
84. See, e.g., Wash. Post Co. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 863 F.2d 96, 100 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (noting that "[t]he relevant inquiry is whether the [information requested]
would reveal the inner workings of the grand jury"); Senate of Puerto Rico v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (requiring "some affirmative
demonstration of a nexus between disclosure and revelation of a protected aspect of the
grand jury's investigation"); SEC v. Dresser Indus., 628 F.2d 1368, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(en banc) (noting that Rule 6(e) "does not require .. . that a veil of secrecy be drawn over
all matters occurring in the world that happen to be investigated by a grand jury"). But see
Fund for Constitutional Gov't v. Nat'l Archives & Records Serv., 656 F.2d 856, 869-70
(D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Witness names are clearly covered.... Potential witnesses and
potential documentary exhibits, while less clearly within the rule, if disclosed would reveal
the direction and strategy of the investigation.").
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detention of material witnesses refers to criminal proceedings in
general, not to grand jury proceedings specifically."
Without elaboration, the district court recognized that there may
be some connection between § 3144 and grand jury proceedings.86
The court concluded, however, that where these laws overlap, the
names of the material witnesses can be disclosed without identifying
them as material witnesses, thereby eliminating any risk that the
grand jury investigations will be compromised.87 As discussed above,
it is estimated that over one thousand people have been or are
currently being detained as a result of post-September 11
investigations. The government has stated that that the majority of
the detainees are held in connection with immigration violations.88
By requiring the government to release only the detainees' names,
the district court allowed the government to withhold information
about why each detainee is in custody. Therefore, no sensitive
information about the inner workings of the grand jury will be
revealed.
The government's reliance on FOIA Exemption 3 rests on the
assumption that § 3144 applies to grand jury proceedings-that is, the
identities of those detained on material witness warrants are
protected by grand jury secrecy under Rule 6(e) and thus exempt
from FOIA disclosure. Precedent supports this general assumption.89
But the government can rely on Exemption 3 only by establishing
that the material witnesses are being held pursuant to grand jury
appearances.9' The district court found that in this case the
85. 18 U.S.C. § 3144; see Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 106. There is
currently a split within the Southern District of New York on the very question of whether
§ 3144 applies to grand jury material witnesses. Compare United States v. Awadallah, 202
F. Supp. 2d 55, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Applying section 3144 to a grand jury proceeding is
an attempt to fit a square peg into a round hole."), with In re Material Witness Warrant
for John Doe, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (declining to follow the holding in
Awadallah and instead finding that § 3144 does include grand jury proceedings). For more
information about the government's use of material witness detention in the aftermath of
the terrorist attacks, see Laurie L. Levenson, Detention, Material Witnesses & the War on
Terrorism, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1217, 1221-25 (2002).
86. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 106.
87. Id.
88. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 939-41 (9th Cir. 1971) (concluding
that because grand jury proceedings are included in the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, § 3149 [the precursor to § 3144] should be read that way as well); In re Material
Witness Warrant for John Doe, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 289-97 (noting that there is ample
authority for the proposition that § 3144 includes grand jury proceedings).
90. In a second supplemental declaration, James Reynolds, Chief of the Terrorism
and Violent Crimes Section in the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, stated:
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government failed to demonstrate that those held on material witness
warrants are in fact waiting to testify before a grand jury.91
The Center for National Security Studies decision requiring the
government to disclose the names of material witness detainees is
consistent with the goals of FOIA because the decision limits the
government's ability to arrest and detain unknown numbers of people
in secret.92 Disclosure of the names will force the government to
comply with constitutional requirements, such as assuring that
detainees are in fact being held because they have information
valuable enough to the government's investigation that they will be
called to testify before a grand jury.
The district court's decision in Center for National Security
Studies does not mention the USA PATRIOT Act, nor does it discuss
its holding within the broader context of the post-September 11
terrorist investigation. Instead, Judge Kessler found as a matter of
law that the government cannot rely on FOIA Exemption 3 to
withhold the names of the detainees.93 Nonetheless, the decision has
significant implications for the government's ongoing investigation
under the authority of the USA PATRIOT Act.
FOIA and section 203 of the USA PATRIOT Act exist in
parallel: both statutes address disclosure of information, both have
the interest of democracy as their driving force. FOIA encourages
agency disclosure of information in order to allow public access to
and oversight of government action. 94 Congress created the USA
PATRIOT Act to provide the government with a wide variety of
"I want to make explicit that each of these warrants [to secure detention of material
witnesses] was issued to procure a witness's testimony before a grand jury." Second
Supplemental Decl. of James Reynolds at $ 4, Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 215 F. Supp. 2d
94 (D.D.C. 2002) (Civil Action No. 01-2500), available at http://cnss.gwu.edu/-cnss/
reynoldssupplemental2.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). This
declaration apparently did not sway Judge Kessler.
91. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 106-07. The court noted that the
Center for National Security Studies did not ask for the names of grand jury witnesses, just
the names of those held as material witnesses. Id. at 106. The court found that the
"affidavits do not establish that those held as material witnesses are in fact grand jury
witnesses.... In fact, it is publicly known that at least eight, possibly more, material
witnesses who were apprehended as potential grand jury witnesses were released and
never testified before a grand jury." Id. at 107. Human Rights Watch also reported that
many of the people detained as material witnesses never testified before a grand jury, and
that their anticipated appearance before a grand jury was in fact only a pretext for their
detention because the government lacked sufficient evidence that would otherwise justify
their detention. Human Rights Watch, supra note 18, at 60-66.
92. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
93. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 106.
94. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
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tools with which to combat terrorism. One tool in particular is
section 203, the amendment of Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure to allow the government to disclose to other
agencies exactly the type of information sought by the Center for
National Security Studies. The rationale for section 203 is that the
government should be able to share information collected by a grand
jury investigation with other government officials, even if the
information would not be shared with the public, if it is, for example,
vital to national security.95 Such disclosure furthers the nation's
security interest. But at what cost?96
The government's attempt to keep the names of the detainees
secret from the public, combined with its new ability to share
information from grand juries with other federal agencies, is
potentially dangerous. The government can now hold people
anonymously and indefinitely without filing criminal charges, while at
the same time gather, and share with other agencies, information
about those people detained and others who may be the target of
criminal investigations. In the words of the Center for National
Security Studies, this activity "raise[s] serious questions about
deprivation of fundamental due process, including imprisonment
without probable cause, [and] interference with the right to
counsel."97 The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects
the people from unreasonable searches and seizures.98 The Fifth
Amendment ensures the right to due process of law.99 And the Sixth
Amendment guarantees the right to counsel.' 0 People held on
material witness warrants have not been charged with any crime, yet
they are denied their fundamental right of freedom, right to an
attorney, and right to be heard. The government is permitted to
detain people under the material witness statute, but it should not be
allowed to hold people without accountability. The effect of the
Center for National Security Studies decision is to ensure some level of
95. See Beale & Felman, supra note 47, at 712-13.
96. Note that the USA PATRIOT Act contains a sunset provision making the Act
ineffective as of December 31, 2005. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 224(a), 115 Stat. 272, 295 (2001). But section 203(a) which amends Rule 6(e) is exempt
from the sunset provision. Id.
97. Letter from Kate Martin, Director, Center for National Securities Studies et al., to
Melanie Ann Pustay, Deputy Director, Office of Information and Privacy, U.S.
Department of Justice (Oct. 29, 2001), http://cnss.gwu.edu/-cnss/arrests/ dojfoia.htm (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review) (requesting information pursuant to the FOIA).
98. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
99. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
100. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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accountability: public scrutiny will help protect the civil liberties of
the detainees.
Because the USA PATRIOT Act gives the government
significant discretion in deciding what information to share with other
agencies, it must be considered within the broader context of what the
public has a right to know and what the public ought to know in order
to support the government's efforts to fight terrorism. In a
democratic society dedicated to openness, the government cannot be
permitted a free hand to prosecute hundreds of people in secret.
Thus Center for National Security Studies may have its greatest effect
by reminding the government that it cannot maintain a wall of silence
toward the public while at the same time break down that silence
within its own walls. To the extent the USA PATRIOT Act increases
disclosure within the government, there must be some corresponding
disclosure by the government to the public to assure that the
government is not unconstitutionally encroaching on individual rights
and access to information.
As far as the detainees are concerned, release of their names as
required by the district court will allow their detention to be
monitored. Interested organizations can contact lawyers and family
members of the detainees to ensure that the detainees have received
adequate treatment and access to information. The safety of the
detainees should not be a concern, as they are being held in federal
prisons. Nevertheless, the district court explicitly noted that any
detainee who did not want his or her identity to be released could
submit such a request to the government.01
It has been almost two years since the terrorist attacks on
Washington, D.C. and New York, and the public still does not know
how many individuals are being held as material witnesses, who they
are, or if they will ever appear before a grand jury. 2 In the
meantime, the government has continued its investigation and may be
adding to the number of people detained.
By requiring the government to release at least the names of the
detainees, the district court ensured some measure of transparency
and accountability with respect to the criminal investigations. The
effect of the court's decision is to limit the USA PATRIOT Act's
101. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. United States Dep't of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 113
(D.D.C. 2002).
102. Following the district court's decision, the government sought and obtained a
motion for a stay pending appeal. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 58-59. The
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit heard oral arguments in November 2002, and a
decision is expected soon.
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potentially dangerous infringements on individual freedom and
disclosure of information, while maintaining the government's ability
to investigate the terrorist attacks.
RACHEL V. STEVENS
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